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The representation of LibDems in the cabinet committee
system evinces a greater role for the party in policy making
across government than might have otherwise have been
supposed
Measures of ‘positional power’ highlight some interesting features of both the balance of
power between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and David Cameron’s style of
leadership. Nicholas Allen ‘s analysis shows that the Liberal Democrats, with 29.4 per cent
of committee places and 31.1 per cent of the total weighted score, have a share of power
that is clearly disproportionate to their contribution to the government’s parliamentary
majority and much larger than their share of all government and cabinet posts.
In polit ics, as in any walk of  lif e, where someone stands on an issue depends in part on
where they sit. It is no less true that polit icians’ ability to shape decisions depends in part on where they
sit. Ambitious MPs may have a smidgen of  inf luence over government policy f rom the backbenches. They
may perhaps have a smidgen more through membership of  a select committee. They will obviously have a
very considerable amount of  inf luence f rom a seat around the cabinet table.
The idea that where someone sits can af f ect their capacity to inf luence policy provides a usef ul window
onto the world of  intra-executive power relations. Polit ical scientists have already taken this idea and
used it to explore the subject. As is well known, much of  the important policy making in Brit ish
government occurs within a system of  cabinet committees. In an innovative study of  John Major ’s
cabinet, later applied to Tony Blair ’s, Patrick Dunleavy developed measures of  ‘posit ional power’ based
on every minister ’s posit ion within this system of  committees. By establishing, f irst, the relative
importance of  the various cabinet committees and, second, which ministers were members of  which
committees, Dunleavy painted a detailed picture of  ministers’ potential inf luence over the whole range of
policy.
Inspired by the approach, a group of  undergraduate students at Royal Holloway, University of  London,
and myself  set about analysing power relations within the current coalit ion government [1]. In the
process we were able to highlight some interesting f eatures of  both the balance of  power between the
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and David Cameron’s style of  leadership. This short blog highlights
some of  our key f indings. Full and f urther details can be f ound in a recently published article.
Re-opening the ‘who won?’ debate
Commentators began asking the question ‘who won the negotiations?’ almost as soon as David
Cameron and Nick Clegg agreed to f orm a coalit ion. Many based their answers on what the parties
agreed to do in government. Writ ing in the Sunday Times, Martin Ivens noted that 164 of  the 397 pledges
in the coalit ion agreement could be f ound in the Liberal Democrat manif esto. Other analysis undertaken
by University College London’s Constitution Unit suggested that three-quarters of  the Liberal Democrats’
manif esto commitments were incorporated into the agreement compared with only three-f if ths of  the
Conservatives’ pledges. Yet other analysis suggested that the coalit ion agreement was, on balance,
closest to the Liberal Democrats’ manif esto in ‘lef t- right’ terms. The general verdict seemed clear: Clegg’s
party had perf ormed disproportionately well in securing policy concessions.
The coalit ion agreement was only the starting point f or what the government would do, however.
Measures need men and women to be implemented; and men and women may shape and modif y
measures. Thus commentators also looked to the allocation of  jobs in the coalit ion. Clegg’s party
constituted less than 16 per cent of  the government’s MPs, but the party f ive obtained f ive cabinet seats
out of  23, nearly 22 per cent, and a f urther twelve junior ministerial posts. Again, the general verdict
seemed to be that Clegg’s party had perf ormed f airly well in this respect, if  not outstandingly.
When it comes to jobs, raw numbers are just one part of  the story. Other f actors, not least where those
jobs are located, obviously matter. In this respect, some commentators noted that the Liberal Democrats
headed only three spending departments, none of  them especially large, whiles others f ocused on the
complete absence of  Liberal Democrat ministers f rom a handf ul of  departments. A f ew crit ics even
suggested that Clegg blundered in not insisting on taking f or himself  one of  the great of f ices of  state,
although quite how he would have been able to monitor government activity whilst running a major
department was conveniently overlooked.
Measuring power across the coalit ion cabinet committees
Surprisingly lit t le attention, however, was paid to the allocation of  seats on the various cabinet
committees. This oversight was perhaps surprising given the resurgent role envisaged f or such
committees in the context of  organising and managing the coalit ion. By September 2010, Cameron had
established nine f ormal cabinet committees and a f urther seven sub-committees. Some 56 ministers had
at least one seat on at least one committee or subcommittee.
Full details of  how we analysed the memberships of  these committees and subcommittees are available
elsewhere. For the time being, it is suf f icient to note that we adapted Dunleavy’s f ormulae to calculate
the relative importance or ‘weighted score’ of  each committee and subcommittee and then every
minister ’s share of  all the weighted scores across the committee system.
Figure 1 summarises the inter-party balance of  power in the cabinet committee system as of  September
2010. As might be expected, the Conservatives had the lion’s share of  all committee seats and the total
sum of  all the committees’ weighted scores. However, the Liberal Democrats, with 29.4 per cent of
committee places and 31.1 per cent of  the total weighted score, had a share of  power that was clearly
disproportionate to their contribution to the government’s parliamentary majority and much larger than
their share of  all government and cabinet posts. In other words, the cabinet committee system concealed
a greater role f or the Liberal Democrats in policy making across government than might have otherwise
have been supposed.
Figure 1: The intra-coalit ion share of government posts, cabinet committee seats and cabinet
committee weighted scores
Figure 2 summarises individual ministers’ share of  power in the committee system. It is immediately
apparent that David Cameron’s capacity to inf luence committee decisions directly appears remarkably
limited. He had only the eighth highest share of  committee inf luence, a relative share much diminished
when compared with his predecessors as prime minister, and he chaired just two committees and a
f urther two subcommittees. Instead it was the Chancellor of  the Exchequer, George Osborne, who
possessed the greatest share of  committee power. The second-placed minister was Danny Alexander,
the Liberal Democrat Chief  Secretary and Osborne’s number two at the Treasury.
Figure 2: Top ten ministers by % share of total weighted score, September 2010
Note: * Minister ‘attending cabinet’. Conservative ministers in blue, Liberal Democrat ministers in yellow
Cameron’s diminished role could be interpreted as a desire to re-establish collective decision making
and/or as an attempt to create more space f or him to f ocus on managing the coalit ion and to arbitrate
between ministers and departments. It could also be interpreted as an attempt to increase the inf luence
of  the Treasury, in the persons of  Osborne and Alexander, in an era of  austerity and f iscal restraint.
However, the analysis also highlights some of  the crit icisms that have been levelled at Cameron’s style
of  governing amid myriad blunders, u-turns and cock-ups involving his ministers. One distinguished
prof essor has accused him of  running a ‘ring-donut’ government and of  having too f eeble a grip on
policy co-ordination. Another has suggested that Cameron has simply given ‘given his ministers f ree rein
to get him, as well as them, into trouble’. Our analysis of  Cameron’s use of  the cabinet committee
system gives f urther credence to these claims.
Any analysis of  the f ormal cabinet committee system necessarily paints a limited picture of  power
relations within the coalit ion government. Posit ions in the system and potential inf luence are merely the
starting point f or understanding the exercise of  power. Nevertheless, relatively f ormal attempts to
analyse power relations can complement some of  the other excellent in-depth studies of  the coalit ion
that are beginning to emerge. They can also lay the ground f or systematic comparison of  changes over
time.
This art icle summarises ‘A Partnership of Unequals: Posit ional power in the coalit ion
government‘ by the Royal Holloway Group.
[i] The students were Hayder Allawi, Emily Bentley-Leek, JamesHickson, James Lewis, Vishal Makol,
Simon Marlow, Miguel Nance, Asad Naqvi, Meera Parmar, Nathan Parsad, Thomas Pratt, Dylan Pritchard,
Rachael Squire, Laura Scanlan, Tiana Tandberg and Louie Woodall.
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